

TD KIGALI 542

OCTOBER 13, 1990
10/13/90 AT 1:32 PM

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C O N F I D E N T I A L D E F E N S E

SUBJECT: GENERAL SITUATION ON OCTOBER 13, 1990, LOCAL TIME 12 PM
REF: MSG 648-650-651-654-657-658-659-661-663-667-670 AND 671/MAM RWA/CD
FROM OCTOBER 1-11TH, 1990.

PRIMO: Military situation:

The military situation is unchanged.

ALPHA: the attackers hold NYAGATARE, controlling in particular the intersection situated 8 kilometers south-southwest of the city, where Rwandan-Zairian forces encountered them on October 12th in the late afternoon.

BRAVO: The Rwandan-Zairian forces reestablished themselves along the MUVUMBA-GABIRO line after having met resistance from the attackers on the west and east axes.

SECUNDO: The Zairian forces

BRAVO: Effectively: the Zairian contingent was reinforced the afternoon of October 12th by 95 men from GOMA (the second unit of SRAM), which brought its strength to about 1,400 men.

BRAVO: Behavior of the F.A.Z:

The behavior of the Zairian troops is a subject of concern for the Rwandan population and for settlements of expatriates. In fact, traders, automobile drivers, and simple pedestrians are held for ransom daily at the Zairian control posts. Certain reports indicate numerous lootings (in particular in GABIRO, where the hotel was entirely stripped bare). Rapes have also been reported. Conscious of the significance of these abuses, the country's highest authorities have decided to take measures within 24 hours (information provided at the A.D. by Colonel RUSATIRA), among which the most probable is the withdrawal of the Zairians from urban zones.

These measures are to reassure the expatriate community.

TERTIO: Various ones.

ALPHA: The Rwandan General Staff reiterates with insistence its wish to see the exportation of the materials which it ordered authorized. The acquisition of those materials seems to precondition the utilization of the successes of the past 48 hours.

This request concerns, more specifically, the following materials:

- 2 "Gazelle" helicopters
- rockets
- 90 mm shells
- Milan missiles

BRAVO: The Hutu peasantry, organized by the MRND, has intensified the search for suspected Tutsis in the foothills; massacres are reported in the region of KIBILIRA, 20 kilometers northwest of GITARAMA. The risk of the generalization of this confrontation, already reported, seems to be becoming concrete.

CHARLIE: The Rwandan government calls for a peacekeeping force capable of controlling the Ugandan-Rwandan border in the north that could intervene (see SECUNDO of MSG 667/2/MAM/RWA/CD from October 10, 1990).

QUARTO: Observations and comments from the post.

On the 13th day of the troubles the following findings and reflections are possible:

ALPHA: The peasant masses (90% of the population) remains loyal to the regime and supports it with their action.

Reasons for support:

- the regime put a single party in place, which, since 1973, has led the entire population locally. So, the cell, the basic unit, groups 30 to 50 families from the same hillside. It constitutes a structure where one expresses oneself, receives orders from those in power, and where one is requested to lend one's action for real results (clinics, schools). But the MRND intervenes without excess and conducts a cunning propaganda directed at old historical and ethnic motivations, which remain powerful in an isolated country, without information (no newspapers, no television, subservient radio broadcasting).
- The excesses of the regime, the misappropriations, are the business of the boss, "the business of the palace," and the populace does not directly suffer from them.
- The lot of farmers has improved worldwide since 1973, despite the recent famine, which was, after all, limited (not to be compared to those of 1945-1947).
- The president has always taken care to come to the aid of the peasants, and he has their sympathy (in May and June he went, himself, to the communes stricken by famine. He was received with enthusiasm).

BRAVO: Those in opposition are intellectuals or civil servants and petty employees and tradespeople, few in number and small in influence.

- Their speeches do not reach the population outside the cities. KIGALI: population of 350,000; BUTARE AND RUHENGERI, respectively: only 35,000 and 25,000.
- Their support from abroad (Ugandan or even Burundian) shocks the nationalist sentiments of the people.

- Their Tutsi and monarchical references bother their audience considerably.
- The fact that many rich people are among their ranks (like the former director of Rwandan Petrol, VALENS KAJEGUHAKWA, who is one of their leaders) naturally assures them no popular base.

CHARLIE: Comments:

1/ The results of these considerations are that:

- The invaders and their domestic supporters seem, as of today, to be able to win only by a classic military operation, accompanied by some terrorist action, whose principal objective would be to take the city of KIGALI and the physical elimination of the president and those loyal to him. Now, this action would necessitate material help, as well as foreign technicians from a country that has the economic and political capability to furnish them. The seeming eventual call to Libya supports this hypothesis. However, it remains hazardous in the current situation.

2/ The government forces are still suffering from reduced numbers and from a lack of means of the same nature (material and technicians) and cannot exploit the loyalty of the peasantry, which participates more and more in the military action, and more deeply, through auto-defense groups armed with bows and machetes. They also will not be able to eventually reverse the situation definitively in their favor without support from an outside aid. Hence the call to friends, particularly to France.

3/ One can broadcast the opinion that this situation is likely to lead to the opening of negotiations between the adversaries, but it would be appropriate, for that, to first convince President HABYARIMANA that it is advisable to hasten the establishment of a government formed taking merit into account rather than ethnic or clan considerations, and a constitution, for which, in any case, he himself recently called. But it will certainly be necessary to provide him with all useful recommendations to take appropriate initiative and to promote organization with such an approach. However, the fact that, probably, his entourage lacks this capacity could restrain his eventual goodwill.

SIGNEDL COL. GALINIE 131300./.

MARTRES